Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) introduce the notion of self-confirming equilibrium, which is generally less restrictive than Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg and Levine also define a concept of consistency and claim in their Theorem 4 that with consistency and other conditions on beliefs, a self-confirming equilibrium has a Nash equilibrium outcome. We provide a counterexample that disproves Theorem 4 and prove an alternative by replacing consistency with a more restrictive concept, which we call strong consistency. In games with observed deviators, self-confirming equilibria are strongly consistent self-confirming equilibria. Hence, our alternative theorem ensures that despite the counterexample, the corollary of Theorem 4 is still valid.
INTRODUCTION
Fudenberg and Levine (1993a; henceforth "FL") introduce the notion of selfconfirming equilibrium. 2 In general, it is less restrictive than the notion of Nash equilibrium. This is mainly because beliefs can be incorrect at off-path information sets in a self-confirming equilibrium, which results in the possibility that two players have different beliefs about the strategy used by a third player. This is illustrated in the "horse" example of . FL define a concept of consistency in an attempt to preclude this possibility, and claim in their Theorem 4 that with consistency and other conditions on beliefs, a self-confirming equilibrium has a Nash equilibrium outcome. We provide a counterexample that disproves Theorem 4 and prove an alternative by replacing consistency with a more restrictive notion, which we call strong consistency.
Briefly, consistency requires that each player's belief be correct at the information sets that are reachable if he sticks to his equilibrium strategy and the opponents deviate. 3 Strong consistency further requires that each player's belief be correct at certain other information sets -those that are reachable if he sticks to actions that he plays on the equilibrium path, the opponents deviate, and he himself deviates at off-path information sets.
As a consequence of the alternative theorem proved here, we have that in games with observed deviators, in particular in two-person games, strong consistency is sufficient to ensure a Nash equilibrium outcome, so the corollary of FL's Theorem 4 is valid.
NOTATION, DEFINITIONS, AND THEOREM 4 OF FL
We follow the same notation as in pp. 525-527 of FL. Here we review and expand it.
Fix an I-player game in extensive form with perfect recall. X is the set of nodes; 4 ; µ i is i's belief (a probability measure over Π −i ); u i (·) is i's expected utility given the argument (a strategy profile or a strategy-belief pair). We assume that each player knows (at least) his own payoff function, the extensive form of the game, and the probability distribution over Nature's moves.
Some new notation follows: N is the set of players. We let
Let p(z|b) denote the probability of reaching the terminal node z given a strategy profile or strategy-belief pair b.
FL define the following concepts: An information set h j , j = i, is relevant to 
it is proved that every two-player game of perfect recall has observed deviators. We say that profile σ ∈ Σ is equivalent to another profile σ ∈ Σ if they lead to the same distribution over terminal nodes, that is, p(z|σ) = p(z|σ ) for all z ∈ Z. 
Definitions 1 and 2 of FL
The set of consistent self-confirming equilibria is strictly smaller than that of self-confirming equilibria, while it is strictly larger than that of Nash equilibrium.
6
It is defined in FL in an attempt to rule out the possibility of a non-Nash outcome, as is claimed in Theorem 4 of FL.
Theorem 4 of FL Every consistent self-confirming equilibrium with independent, unitary beliefs is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium.
The next section provides a counterexample to this theorem. It also establishes 6 The examples in which consistent self-confirming equilibrium distinguishes itself from selfconfirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium are given in FL. See Example 1 of FL for selfconfirming equilibrium, and see Examples 2, 3, and 4 of FL (and the game in Figure 1 of the present paper which we will explain in the next section) for Nash equilibrium. We will show that (R 1 , r 2 ) is played in a consistent self-confirming equilibrium with independent, unitary beliefs while it is not a Nash equilibrium outcome.
To see that (R 1 , r 2 ) is played in a consistent self-confirming equilibrium with independent, unitary beliefs, consider the strategy profile s
We first verify that this is a consistent self-confirming equilibrium by considering the beliefs of players 1, 2, and 3 to be ((
respectively. Table 1 presents these strategies and beliefs. It is easy to see that no player has an incentive to deviate from s * under these beliefs: By playing L 1 player 1 expects the payoff 0; by playing l 2 player 2 expects the payoff 0; and h 2 and h 3 lie off the equilibrium path so that there is no incentive to deviate at these information sets. Thus, it suffices to show that each player has the correct belief at the information sets reachable under his equilibrium strategy. 7 The beliefs 7 Player i's belief is defined as a measure on the space Π −i , so the term "correct belief at information set h j " is not appropriate; throughout this paper, we use it to mean "belief that is correct at h j " in order to simplify exposition. specified above (or in Table 1 ) are incorrect only in that player 1 believes 2 will play R 2 at h 2 and player 2 believes 3 will play L 3 at h 3 . These incorrect beliefs hold in a consistent self-confirming equilibrium because h 2 is not included in H(R 1 ), and h 3 is not included in H((L 2 , r 2 )). Thus s * is a consistent self-confirming equilibrium.
Moreover, s * has independent, unitary beliefs, because correlations are not allowed in each player's belief, and beliefs are concentrated on singletons.
Next, we show that (R 1 , r 2 ) cannot be played in a Nash equilibrium. To see this, suppose the contrary, i.e., that (R 1 , r 2 ) is played in a Nash equilibrium. If player 3 played R 3 with a probability greater than 1/3, then player 2 would take l 2 with probability 1. So player 3 must be playing L 3 with a probability at least 2/3. This means that if player 1 plays L 1 , he obtains at least 2 as his payoff. Thus no matter how player 3 plays, at least one of players 1 and 2 has an incentive to deviate. This means that (R 1 , r 2 ) cannot be played in a Nash equilibium.
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In FL's proof of their Theorem 4, they construct a strategy profile π that is supposed to be a Nash equilibrium. In our example, π is (
this is not a Nash equilibrium since player 1 would have an incentive to deviate.
9
The example also establishes that Theorems 1 and 3 of FL are incorrect as well, and the proof of their Theorem 2 needs a correction. Theorem 1 claims that, even if we relax condition (ii) for consistent self-confirming equilibrium by allowing beliefs to also be incorrect at information sets that cannot be reached when opponents' equilibrium strategies are fixed, the set of possible strategy profiles does not change.
In our example, strategy profile (
is not a consistent self-confirming 8 It would be easy to see that this example holds for an open set of payoffs around the payoffs we give. Thus the example is not a trivial one.
9 There is an illogical jump when FL claim "
In fact, it is satisfied only for all s i ∈ support(σ i ). Moreover, π is not well defined for information sets which are reached only by deviations made by more than one player. equilibrium since player 1, being restricted to believe that player 3 will play L 3 , has an incentive to deviate. On the other hand, this strategy profile is allowed in the relaxed condition: Since player 2's strategy makes h 3 unreachable, 1's belief about 3's strategy can be arbitrary.
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Theorem 3 claims that, for each consistent self-confirming equilibrium of a game whose information sets are ordered by precedence, there is an equivalent extensiveform correlated equilibrium of Forges (1986) . It is straightforward to check that s * is not an extensive-form correlated equilibrium. Figure 1 10 Theorem 1 can be modified without loss of the intuition by slightly modifying one of its conditions. Specifically, replace condition (iii) of the Definition in Section 4 with condition (iii') as follows:
Condition (iii'):
11 Theorem 3 and its corollary can be shown to be true by replacing consistency with strong consistency, which we will define in Section 4. Table 1 4
. STRONGLY CONSISTENT SELF-CONFIRMING EQUILIBRIUM AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM
To define the equilibrium concept that enables us to rule out non-Nash outcomes, we need one more piece of notation. Let Definition Profile σ ∈ Σ is a strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium
Proposition 1 Every strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium with independent, unitary beliefs is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium.
The difference between consistency and strong consistency can be best seen in the example in the previous section: (R 1 , r 2 ) is not played in any strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium: If it were, then player 2 must have the correct belief at h 3 . This is because h 3 can be reached by the action combination (L 1 , R 2 ), which does not contradict 2's on-path play, namely r 2 . Because player 1 must also have the correct belief at h 3 , players 1 and 2's beliefs about the strategy of player 3 must coincide. This implies (R 1 , r 2 ) cannot satisfy the best-response condition (condition (i) of the Definition), as we have seen already.
A strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium can have a non-Nash out-
come.
12 This is immediate because Proposition 2 below ensures that strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium reduces to self-confirming equilibrium in games with observed deviators.
Proposition 2 In games with observed deviators, hence a fortiori in twoplayer games, self-confirming equilibria are strongly consistent self-confirming.
We omit the proof for this proposition. It is just a matter of showing that in games with observed deviators, action-possible information sets for player i that lie off the equilibrium path are not relevant to him.
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This establishes that the following result from FL holds without any modification as a corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary In games with observed deviators, and hence a fortiori in twoplayer games, every self-confirming equilibrium with independent, unitary beliefs is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium.
Now, we are going to prove Proposition 1. Intuitively, the proof of the main theorem is as follows: Fix a strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium, σ, and construct a new strategy profile, σ , as follows:π k (σ k )(h k ) is how player i believes k will play at the information set h k if h k is relevant to player i. For an information set which is irrelevant to all the players, the strategy is specified arbitrarily by how player j actually plans to play. This construction is well defined because strong consistency ensures, as we will see, that if an information set h k is relevant to both players i and j, they have the correct beliefs at h k so that they have the same beliefs at h k . Thus σ is a Nash equilibrium because σ −i is constructed according to player i's belief µ i whenever an information set in question is relevant to i, and i takes a best response against µ i by the condition (i) of the Definition. A formal proof is given below.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let σ be a strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium with independent, unitary beliefs. The condition of unitary beliefs ensures that a single belief rationalizes all s i ∈ support(σ i ). For each player i, take one such belief, denoted
Before proceeding, we need one more piece of notation:
j where for each h j ∈ H j and each a j ∈ A(h j ):
We now construct each player k's behavior strategy π k by the rule 14 :
14 This construction is different from the original in FL.
The construction of π k in (1) is well defined. To see this, first observe that
holds. This is because player i's belief about j's strategy is correct at on-path information sets, by condition (iii) of the Definition.
By the condition of unitary beliefs, this implies that player j has the correct belief at all h k ∈ R i (µ i ). Similarly, player i has the correct belief at all h k ∈ R j (µ j ). Thus if h k ∈ R i (µ i ) and h k ∈ R j (µ j ), i = k = j, the beliefs of players i and j about k's strategy at the information set h k are correct, so in particular π
Now, construct each player i's strategy σ i and belief µ i by
whereσ i (π i ) is a mixed strategy induced by (giving the same outcome as) π i .
We will show that this σ is a Nash equilibrium.
Because of the condition of independent beliefs, from the Lemma in the Ap-
Now define µ i such that
Then from (5) and (6),
For
, and
By (1), (2), and (6),
From this and (7), we can apply Lemma 1 of FL 15 to have for all
which mean, according to (2) and (6), for all
From (4) and (8), we have for all
Because of condition (i) of the Definition, for all
From the above two expressions and (2), we obtain: ∀i ∈ N , ∀s i ∈ support(σ i ),
This inequality implies that σ is a Nash equilibrium if we establish that σ and σ are equivalent, because then we can replace "support(σ i )" in the above inequality by "support(σ i )". 16 Thus to conclude the proof, it now suffices to show 15 Lemma 1 of FL states that: "If µ i andμ i are two distributions on Π −i such that µ
16 To see this, first note that fixing σ −i , "∀s i ∈ support(σ i )" in the last inequality can be replaced by "∀s i s.t.
[
by the assumption that σ is equivalent to σ . But this contradicts a). So we can replace "∀s i ∈ support(σ i )" by "∀s i s.t.
". A special case of this is "∀s i ∈ support(σ i )". From this and (2), (3) and (8), we obtain, for all s i ∈ support(σ i ), 
Proof of Lemma
Define h(a j ) = A −1 (a j ) to be the information set where the action a j is possible.
The path of actions to z ∈ Z,ã(z), is the set of actions which are necessarily taken to get to the terminal node z. Let Z(s i ) be the set of the terminal nodes reachable under s i ; For all z ∈ Z, p(z|s i , π 
